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doctrines about Jesus’s divinity and the Church’s message about him are 
probably true.
For all of the book’s strengths, there are some notable weaknesses in it. 
In a text that only briefly skims the surface of issues that can literally de-
termine how one evaluates the fundamental truth claims of Christianity, 
Swinburne might have offered some bibliographical resources at the end 
of each chapter (or at the end of the book) for the reader to pursue. Lastly, 
Swinburne does not mention anyone with views that are different from 
or even contrary to his own. In the same vein, it is troubling that he does 
not spend more time elaborating on the challenges that other religious 
scholars pose to the a posteriori evidence for Christian theism (from, say, 
Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, etc.). Thus, a little more negative 
apologetics would have illuminated his overall argument. Undoubtedly 
there will be New Testament scholars who will gainsay the evidence that 
Swinburne marshals in favor of certain components of Jesus’s pre-Easter 
teaching and ministry. Unfortunately, he does not inform the reader of 
the bewildering amount of disagreement that currently exists among New 
Testament specialists in this regard (for example, Dale Allison and Ray-
mond Brown are two reputable scholars who would deny that Jesus pro-
claimed his own deity during his lifetime).
This is not just another apologetics book. John Paul II’s clarion call for 
Christian philosophers and fundamental theologians to defend the faith is 
clearly embodied in was Jesus God? In spite of its minor omissions, those 
who seek to give reasons for Christian faith might well examine Swin-
burne’s newest book. It will give plenty of food for thought.
Moral skepticisms, by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Oxford University Press, 
2006. Pp. xiv + 271. $85.00 (cloth), $19.95 (paper)
E. J. COFFMAN, University of Tennessee
This book argues for two main conclusions: Pyrrhonian Moral skepticism 
(we should suspend judgment on the question of whether any moral be-
liefs are epistemically justified) and Moderate Moral skepticism (moral beliefs 
can be “modestly justified” but not “extremely justified”—more on these 
terms below). Sinnott-Armstrong calls the conjunction of these claims 
Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral skepticism.
The book has two main parts. In Part I, Sinnott-Armstrong’s main 
goals are (a) to identify the best arguments for the conclusion that there 
is no moral knowledge (chapters 2–4) and (b) to develop an argument 
for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism (chapters 5–6). Chapter 1 helpfully sets 
the stage by distinguishing moral epistemology from other areas within 
moral theory. In Part II, Sinnott-Armstrong builds a case for Moderate 
Moral Skepticism by evaluating four replies to (what he regards as) one of 
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the strongest arguments against moral knowledge (which he presents in 
§4.3.1): a version of the familiar regress argument against justified belief in 
general, applied specifically to moral beliefs. The four non-skeptical posi-
tions in moral epistemology that Sinnott-Armstrong assesses in Part II are 
Naturalism (some moral beliefs are inferentially justified by non-normative 
beliefs), Normativism (some moral beliefs are inferentially justified by non-
moral normative beliefs), intuitionism (some justified moral beliefs don’t 
owe their justification to any other beliefs), and Coherentism (some moral 
beliefs are justified by virtue of their coherence with other beliefs). Sin-
nott-Armstrong argues that while some of these positions provide reason 
to think there could be “modestly justified” moral beliefs, none provides 
any reason to think moral beliefs could be “extremely justified.’ His over-
all verdict about the regress argument against justified moral belief that 
structures Part II is this: the argument fails when put in terms of “modest 
justification” but succeeds when put in terms of “extreme justification.”
This book has much to recommend it. It is accessible, engaging, com-
prehensive, and novel; even those previously unfamiliar with the issues 
Sinnott-Armstrong engages will enjoy learning a lot of moral epistemol-
ogy from it (as did I). That’s not to say, of course, that the book is an un-
mitigated success. Indeed, I think the failure of Sinnott-Argument’s argu-
ment for Moderate Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism is overdetermined. I’ll 
try to justify this negative verdict after relaying the main line of argument 
in Moral skepticisms.
Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism runs 
as follows. You are justified in believing P only if you are justified in be-
lieving P “out of the relevant contrast class” (p. 94), where a contrast class 
for P is a set of mutually excluding propositions containing P (p. 85). You 
are justified in believing P out of a given contrast class, C, “when and only 
when [you are] able to rule out all other members of C but [are] not able 
to rule out P” (p. 86). So, to be justified in believing P, you must be “able to 
rule out” any “relevant alternative” to P.
What enables you to rule out a proposition? A “believer’s grounds” 
(p. 86) are what enable the believer to rule out alternatives to P:
The believer would not have this ability without some grounds that would 
rule out the alternatives, but the believer need not consciously think about 
these grounds or use them in any procedure in order to be able to rule out 
the alternatives. Moreover, grounds can rule out alternatives without being 
conclusive. They can be fallible and defeasible, uncertain and incomplete.  
. . . The needed grounds might include perception, memory, introspection, 
reflection, testimony, or any kind of justificatory procedure. (p. 87)
Further, Sinnott-Armstrong contends that the following “three conditions 
are all necessary for a ground to provide any positive epistemic support” 
(p. 68): the ground is “(a) not neutral between competing beliefs . . . ; and 
also (b) not undermined . . . ; and also (c) not question-begging” (p. 68). 
Throughout the book, expressions like ‘non-question-begging ground for 
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P’ mean something like ‘ground that enables one to present a non-question- 
begging argument for P’ (cf. pp. 79–80, 150, 161–166, 235–236).
On the account of epistemic justification Sinnott-Armstrong proposes, 
then, you are justified in believing P only if you have grounds that enable 
you to present a non-question-begging argument against any relevant al-
ternative to P (cf. p. 94). But “deep problems arise for every attempt to 
specify which contrast class is the one that is really relevant” (p. 98). Now 
Sinnott-Armstrong correctly notes that “[t]his difficulty in determining 
which contrast class is relevant does not entail that there is no fact of the 
matter about which contrast class is relevant” (p. 129). But he goes on to 
claim that “in the absence of any idea about how to settle on one contrast 
class as opposed to other candidates, it seems better to avoid any claim 
that any contrast class is the relevant one” (p. 129). That is, we should 
“give up the notion of real relevance and suspend belief about whether or 
not any contrast class is really relevant or the relevant one” (p. 103). Ac-
cordingly, we should suspend judgment on the question of whether any 
particular belief is justified—moral beliefs included.
That is the argument for Pyrrhonian Moral Skepticism. Now for Sinnott- 
Armstrong’s case for Moderate Moral Skepticism (moral beliefs can be 
“modestly justified” but not “extremely justified”). You are modestly justi-
fied in believing P iff you are able to rule out every member of the “modest 
contrast class for P” except P itself (p. 90). The modest contrast class for P is 
the set containing P along with “all propositions contrary to P that need 
to be [ruled out] in order to meet the usual epistemic standards”—i.e., 
“the standards that people usually apply,” which we can learn “simply by 
doing a survey to determine [what most people think] must be ruled out 
for a belief to be justified” (p. 89). You are extremely justified in believing P 
if you are able to rule out all members of the “extreme contrast class for 
P” save P itself (p. 90). The extreme contrast class for P is the set containing 
P along with “all propositions contrary to P, including skeptical scenarios 
that are systematically uneliminable” (p. 89).
Moderate Moral Skepticism amounts to this: while a person could (in 
principle) rule out all other (“non-P”) members of the modest contrast class 
for some moral proposition P, no one could (even in principle) rule out 
all other members of the extreme contrast class for P. Throughout Part II, 
Sinnott-Armstrong suggests a number of ways one might gain modest jus-
tification to believe some moral propositions (see, e.g., pp. 140, 150–151, 
166–167, 250). But the following argument that no one could be extreme-
ly justified in believing any moral proposition survives: Moral Nihilism 
(“nothing is morally wrong or required, good or bad, and so on” [36]) is 
a member of the extreme contrast class for any moral proposition. And 
Moral Nihilism
is constructed so as to leave no way to rule it out. Since moral nihilists ques-
tion all of our beliefs that anything is morally wrong, and so on, they leave 
us with no moral starting points on which to base arguments against them 
without begging the question at issue. If we cannot start from moral premis-
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es, then the only way to refute moral nihilism is to derive moral conclusions 
from morally neutral premises, but all such attempts are subject to strong 
criticisms from many philosophers, not only moral skeptics. So there seems 
to be no way to rule out moral nihilism. (p. 79)
But we can be extremely justified in believing some moral proposition only 
if we can rule out Moral Nihilism. Moderate Moral Skepticism follows.
We now have before us Sinnott-Armstrong’s main line of argument in 
Moral skepticisms. I’ll close by raising two worries about it.
First, an objection to the argument for Pyrrhonian Moral skepticism. re-
call the following key premise of that argument: Since “deep problems 
arise for every attempt to specify which contrast class is the one that is re-
ally relevant” (p. 98), we should “give up the notion of real relevance and 
suspend belief about whether or not any contrast class is really relevant 
or the relevant one” (p. 103). I disagree. Suppose you accept Sinnott-Arm-
strong’s account of epistemic justification, along with his view that we 
have no “idea about how to settle on one contrast class as opposed to other 
candidates” (p. 129). Still, we often have excellent reason to countenance a 
phenomenon despite lacking a satisfactory theory of it. I think this is true 
of “real relevance” (assuming, for present purposes, Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
account of justification). It’s exceedingly plausible that you are justified 
in believing (say) that you exist. But if you’re justified in believing that 
you exist (E), then (by Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of justification) some 
contrast class for E is the relevant one. Or, to put it a bit differently, some 
alternatives to E are the relevant alternatives to E. So, we have excellent 
reason to think there is such a thing as “real relevance”—notwithstanding 
the (alleged) fact that “deep problems arise for every attempt to specify 
which contrast class is the one that is really relevant.”
Second, an objection to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument for Moderate 
Moral Skepticism. As we’ve seen, that argument depends crucially on the 
claim that there’s “no way to rule out moral nihilism.” And that claim de-
pends crucially on Sinnott-Armstrong’s view that you can rule P out only if 
you have some non-question-begging ground for ~P, some ground that en-
ables you to present a non-question-begging argument against P. But this 
is much too strong a requirement to place on our ordinary notion of ruling 
out, which is what Sinnott-Armstrong means to invoke (cf. p. 78). Suppose 
I believe (via introspection) that I’m thinking, and infer from this that I ex-
ist. Now if we can ever rule anything out—and Sinnott-Armstrong thinks 
we can: recall, e.g., his commitment to the possibility of modestly justified 
moral beliefs—, then I can rule out the proposition i don’t exist. But as far as 
I can see, none of my grounds enables me to present a non-question-beg-
ging argument for the thesis that I exist. In particular, my introspection-
based belief that I’m thinking doesn’t enable me to present a non-question-
begging argument that I exist. Whatever exactly it is for an argument to 
beg the question, “I’m thinking, so I exist” seems to achieve it.
The upshot is that a person can have the ability to rule out a proposi-
tion even if she lacks non-question-begging grounds for the denial of that 
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proposition. But then the (alleged) fact that we lack non-question-begging 
grounds for the denial of Moral Nihilism doesn’t entail that we can’t rule 
out Moral Nihilism: even if we lack non-questioning-begging grounds 
against Moral Nihilism, we may nevertheless be able to rule it out. At a 
minimum, if Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument for Moderate Moral Skepti-
cism is to succeed, he will need to defend it from the objection that he has 
tied the epistemic notion of being able to rule out too tightly to the dialecti-
cal notion of being able to present a non-question-begging argument against.
Jesus and Philosophy: New essays, edited by Paul K. Moser. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009. Pp. 236. $64.00 (cloth), $25.00 (paper)
MICHAEL W. AUSTIN, Eastern Kentucky University
This new collection of essays explores the philosophical relevance of the 
founder of the Christian movement, Jesus of Nazareth. The book includes 
contributions from Old and New Testament scholars, theologians, and 
philosophers. In the introduction, philosopher Paul Moser engages in 
a substantive discussion of the similarities and differences between the 
movements born in Jerusalem and Athens. The movement of the disciples 
of Jesus and the center of Western philosophy share a concern for truth, 
and seek knowledge of the truth. Moser characterizes Athens as the birth-
place of a wisdom movement in which humans are moral and intellectual 
agents in pursuit of a good life. Jerusalem, on the other hand, through 
Jesus, Paul, and others, is a Good News power movement. This movement 
offers more than wisdom. It offers power to human beings, the power of 
comprehensive redemption (spiritual, moral, and physical). Moser takes 
philosophy to be a kerygmatic discipline, at least when we consider the 
disciplinary impact of the person of Jesus on it. For the Good News pow-
er movement of Jesus, what matters most is love of God and then love 
of neighbor as ourselves. In light of this, all human projects, including 
philosophical projects, should contribute to the satisfaction of these love 
commands. Philosophy should go beyond mere discussion and move into 
obedience mode. That is, a discussion of the perennial questions of phi-
losophy has value, but philosophers must engage in their discussions in 
compliance with the divine love commands. Moreover, philosophers and 
others should not be satisfied with mere discussion, but should be recep-
tive to God’s love and in turn motivated to follow and obey God from the 
heart. The three sections of the book—Jesus in His First Century Thought 
Context, Jesus in Medieval Philosophy, and Jesus in Contemporary Philos-
ophy—expound on these issues in order to more fully grasp the relevance 
of Jesus of Nazareth to philosophy as an intellectual discipline.
In the first section of the book, the chapter by Craig Evans includes 
an analysis of the available sources that contain information about the 
